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Figure 1: Example of partially attacked DeepFake video. The green and red boxes represent real and fake faces respectively.
This figure illustrates that not all faces in a fake video are manipulated. Real and fake faces may appear in the same frame.
Face labels of one person in nearby frames may also be different.
ABSTRACT
With the rapid development of facial manipulation techniques, face
forgery has received considerable attention in multimedia and com-
puter vision community due to security concerns. Existing methods
are mostly designed for single-frame detection trained with precise
image-level labels or for video-level prediction by only modeling
the inter-frame inconsistency, leaving potential high risks for Deep-
Fake attackers. In this paper, we introduce a new problem of partial
face attack in DeepFake video, where only video-level labels are
provided but not all the faces in the fake videos are manipulated.
We address this problem by multiple instance learning framework,
treating faces and input video as instances and bag respectively. A
sharp MIL (S-MIL) is proposed which builds direct mapping from
instance embeddings to bag prediction, rather than from instance
embeddings to instance prediction and then to bag prediction in
traditional MIL. Theoretical analysis proves that the gradient van-
ishing in traditional MIL is relieved in S-MIL. To generate instances
that can accurately incorporate the partially manipulated faces,
spatial-temporal encoded instance is designed to fully model the
intra-frame and inter-frame inconsistency, which further helps to
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promote the detection performance.We also construct a new dataset
FFPMS for partially attacked DeepFake video detection, which can
benefit the evaluation of different methods at both frame and video
levels. Experiments on FFPMS and the widely used DFDC dataset
verify that S-MIL is superior to other counterparts for partially
attacked DeepFake video detection. In addition, S-MIL can also be
adapted to traditional DeepFake image detection tasks and achieve
state-of-the-art performance on single-frame datasets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rise of face manipulation techniques has fueled the advent of
forgery face images and videos [10, 11, 49, 50]. As the swapped faces
becomemore and more lifelike with advanced deep learning models
such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), these techniques,
e.g., DeepFake [10], are abused for malicious purposes, e.g., face
recognition attack or even political persecution. To enhance the
content security, it is crucial to develop more advanced forgery
detection technology.
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In previous study, the DeepFake video detection is either treated
as a forgery image detection problem, or addressed as a video level
fake prediction problem with video feature learning. Different from
traditional setting, we address a new problem that exists more
ubiquitously in real situations, i.e., partial faces attack in a video
where not all faces in a fake video are manipulated. This problem
can be illustrated from two aspects, as shown in Fig. 1. Firstly, real
and fake faces may occur simultaneously in one frame. Secondly,
faces of one target person may be partially manipulated in one
DeepFake video due to arbitrary content attack behaviors.
Existing DeepFake video detection methods can be divided into
frame-based [13, 33, 42, 43, 48] and video-based methods [45].
Frame-based methods meet with three major difficulties when ap-
plied to fake video detection with partial faces attack. First, they
are generally data hungry and require a remarkable number of
labeled frames for training [21, 27]. Their performances may drop
significantly when detecting partially attacked DeepFake videos
since they simply treat video labels as frame labels. Besides, every
sampled frame needs to be predicted for final prediction during in-
ference, which is very computationally exhaustive. The video-level
decision making based on frame-level representation is another key
issue for frame-based methods. Using the maximum fake scores
over faces or averaging them may lead to unexpected false alarm
or false negative predictions. For video-based methods [45], more
attention is paid on the temporal feature modeling, which is less ef-
fective for DeepFake detection under partial attack situation since it
is also highly dependent on appearance modeling. Thus, traditional
solutions leave potential high risks for DeepFake attackers.
Considering that videos are only given the video-level anno-
tation in many practical situations, we address DeepFake video
detection based on multiple instance learning (MIL) framework by
treating faces and input video as instances and bag respectively.
One bag consists of multiple instance and only bag labels are avail-
able. When one instance is positive, the corresponding bag will be
labeled as positive. This setting is naturally suitable for DeepFake
video detection task. However, in traditional MIL, instance predic-
tions have to be learned based on bag labels, and bag prediction
has to be made based upon instance predictions. Thus, gradient
vanishing occurs constantly when the fake score of one instance
in a bag is high. This issue leads to partial fake instance detection
results [23]. Research endeavor has been dedicated to more careful
network design [23, 53]. Nevertheless, theoretic insight on how the
gradient vanishing problem can be alleviated has not been provided.
The research challenge can be further analysed from the attacker
side where DeepFake [10] tampers video on specific frames, which
inevitably causes spatial-temporal inconsistency in nearby frames,
evidenced as the content jitters. However, in traditional MIL, in-
stances are generated by considering appearance cues only. This
issue has to be tackled with a careful design of instance structure
by considering both the rich spatial and temporal cues in videos.
In this paper, we propose Sharp Multiple Instance Learning (S-
MIL) for DeepFake video detection. Different from traditional MIL
where bag prediction has to be made upon instance prediction built
on the multi-dimensional instance feature space, we apply Sigmoid
on a weighted sum operation on a bag of instance embeddings
to directly produce the bag prediction. Consequently, the loss on
bag prediction can be directly propagated to instance embeddings,
which can help to ease the gradient vanishing problem. Besides, the
proposed S-MIL can still be explained in traditional MIL probabilis-
tic framework, which benefits for comprehensive theoretic analysis.
Accordingly, it can be theoretically derived that the gradient surface
of the loss with respect to the instance prediction of S-MIL tends
to be much sharper than traditional MIL, so the gradient vanish-
ing problem during the back propagation from bag prediction to
instance embeddings can be effectively alleviated. Based on the
proposed S-MIL, we propose to produce multiple spatial-temporal
instances to fully model the intra-frame and inter-frame inconsis-
tency caused by independent frame attacking behavior to generate
forgery faces.
To inspire research on video-level DeepFake detection under
partial faces manipulation situations, we construct a new dataset
named FaceForensics Plus with Mixing samples (FFPMS) for par-
tially attacked DeepFake video detection. The dataset contains
both frame-level and video-level annotations for more comprehen-
sive evaluation while models are allowed to be trained using only
the video-level annotations. Experiments on FFPMS dataset verify
that S-MIL is superior to other competitors for partially attacked
DeepFake video detection. Also, S-MIL can make a more accurate
judgement on whether a video is fake or not than other methods on
DFDC benchmark. S-MIL can also be adapted to traditional single-
frame detection task and achieve state-of-the-art performance on
the FF++ datasets [43], showing a promising result for face infor-
mation protection.
The major contributions of our paper include:
• We introduce a new problem named partial faces attack in
DeepFake video detection and propose S-MIL to address
this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
MIL-based solution for DeepFake video detection. Theoret-
ical analysis shows that S-MIL can alleviate the gradient
vanishing problem effectively.
• We design a new spatial-temporal instance to capture the
inconsistency between faces, which can help to improve the
accuracy of DeepFake detection.
• We propose FFPMS dataset with both frame-level and video-
level annotations for video-based DeepFake face detection.
• We verify that our approach is superior to other counterparts
for video face forgery detection and our S-MIL can also be
adapted to traditional single-frame detection.
2 RELATEDWORK
DeepFake detection obtains considerable attention due to the secu-
rity concerns caused by the abuse of face swapping techniques. In
this section, we briefly review typical detection methods and works
related to multi-instance learning.
2.1 DeepFake Detection
According to the detection target, DeepFake detection can be di-
vided into image-level detection and video-level detection. Early
works [18, 19, 35] achieve the forgery face detection by handcraft
features, as the facemanipulation techniques are limited at that time.
These traditionalmanipulationmethods typically swap the face area
based on the facial landmarks and then utilize some post-processing
techniques to make the boundary of swapped face inconspicuous.
With the development of generative adversarial network (GAN) [20,
40], the forgery faces become more and more realistic. Therefore,
some works [6, 9, 41, 51] begin to utilize deep networks to learn
discriminative features or find manipulation traces for DeepFake
detection. For instance, Rossler et al. [43] introduce a simple but
effective Xception Net as a binary DeepFake image detector and Li
et al. [28] as well as Lingzhi et al. [27] aim at the finding traces such
as blending boundaries left by the DeepFake generation methods
with deep neural networks. They are trained with frame-level labels
and can achieve high accuracies for DeepFake image detection.
Compared to the forgery images, video-level forgeries [10, 49, 50]
are more harmful, since they look more convincing with real audio.
The above frame-based methods [1, 21, 27, 28] can also be used
to detect video forgeries. The typical solution is choosing some
frames randomly from the video and taking the max or average
score as the final score of this video for classification (real or fake).
However, the maximum operation may lead to a false alarm while
averaging may cause false negative prediction because the scores
on manipulated faces are overwhelmed by those of normal faces.
Previous researchers have also explored to address DeepFake video
detection as a video level prediction problem with video feature
learning. Likewise, Sabir et al. [45] propose to use recurrent convolu-
tional models [22] to exploit the temporal information in DeepFake
videos. However, they are limited in some cases since face forgery
detection is highly dependent on appearance modeling.
2.2 Multiple Instance Learning
For a typical Multiple-instance learning (MIL) method, the model
receives a group of labeled bags which consist of many instances,
rather than requiring instances that are labeled individually. MIL
aims to learn a model that can predict the bag label [2, 24, 52].
In the early work of MIL, pre-computed features or hand-craft
features are utilized to represent the instances [12, 32]. The boom
of deep learning-based approaches further enhances the ability of
multi-instance learning by a large margin [34, 52], especially for
medical image scenarios [39, 47]. Generally speaking, MIL algo-
rithms can be divided into two fold: instance-space paradigm and
embedded-space paradigm [53]. Traditional MIL generally follows
instance-space paradigm, which aggregates instances on output
layer. Some works claim that it is inflexible and propose to do
mean-pooling or max-pooling in embedded-space [17, 38, 56]. But
both operators are non-trainable and susceptible to extreme values,
which potentially limits their applicability.
The attention mechanism can relive the above weakness by
focusing on key instances, which is widely used in recent works [5,
31, 54]. Inspired by the idea of lp-norm pooling [16], Zagoruyko
et al. [55] propose a novel attention mechanism that requires a
student model to mimic the feature map of an attention model
(teacher model), which enhances the performance of the student
model significantly. Recently, the attention mechanism has been
also used in some MIL works [23, 36, 37]. For example, Ilse et al.
[23] claim that traditional MIL may face the gradient vanishing
problem and they propose an attention-based MIL network that
achieves the attention weights training by a small neural network.
However, theoretic insight on how the gradient vanishing problem
can be alleviated has not been provided.
3 OUR APPROACH
In this section, we illustrate the proposed algorithm in detail. As
shown in Fig. 2, our algorithm consists of three key components.
First, face detection is conducted on the sampled frames in in-
put videos. The extracted faces are then fed into a CNN to obtain
features as instances. Second, spatial and temporal instances are
extracted with corresponding encoding branches to form spatial-
temporal bags with different temporal kernel sizes. These bags are
used together to represent a video. Last, S-MIL is performed on
these bags to get the final fake scores of all bags, which can derive
a final fake score for the whole video.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Formally, for N videos in an input batch, the goal for binary classi-
fication is to minimize the following objective function:
L = −
N∑
i=1
(yi logpi + (1 − yi )log(1 − pi )), pi = F (W ,xi ), (1)
where yi , pi are the label, prediction of the i-th video xi . F andW
are the prediction model and trainable parameters respectively.
For one single video, traditional DeepFake detection methods
tend to convert the above video level prediction task to frame level
task by training a supervised per-frame binary classifier [1, 27, 43].
During inference, averaging or maximizing is performed to get the
final prediction of input video:
pi =

1
M
∑M
j=1 p
j
i =
1
M
∑M
j=1 F (W ,x ji ), Average
max
j ∈[1,M ]
p
j
i = maxj ∈[1,M ]
F (W ,x ji ), Maximum (2)
where p ji andM are the fake score of the j-th frame and the total
frame number in video xi respectively.
The above formulation will force every frame in fake videos to
be predicted as fake. However, it is inaccurate since fake videos may
only contain part of the manipulated target faces. Simply applying
the video label to frame label may result in noises. Furthermore,
when generating video-level label with face labels, using the max-
imum fake scores may lead to false alarms while averaging may
lead to false negative predictions. Under MIL framework, we treat
videos as an integral instead of analyzing frame by frame.
For a typical MIL work, the model receives labeled bags which
consist of different number of instances, rather than requiring in-
stances labeled individually. MIL classifier aims to predict the labels
of testing bags. A bag is labeled as negative when all the instances in
this bag are negative, while a bag is labeled as positive when there
is at least one instance in this bag that is positive [52]. Formally, for
a given bag with a bag label yi ∈ {0, 1}, it consists ofM instances.
For the i-th bag in MIL,
yi =
{
0, if
∑M
j=1 y
j
i = 0
1, otherwise
(3)
We fit MIL into DeepFake video detection. Following the tradi-
tional MIL definition, the probability for a bag is:
pi = 1 −
M∏
j=1
(1 − p ji ). (4)
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Figure 2: Structure of the proposed algorithm which consists of three modules. Given a frame sequence from a video, our
approach firstly detects faces and extracts individual feature maps by CNN. Then, the feature maps of the face sequences are
encoded as spatial-temporal instances to get multiple spatial-temporal bags. After that, the resulted features of instances in
different bags are integrated by the proposed sharpmulti-instance learningmethod. Finally, S-MIL is performed on these bags
to get the final video prediction (real or fake).
Then the objective function of input bags can be denoted as:
L = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi log(1−
M∏
j=1
(1−p ji ))+ (1−yi )log(
M∏
j=1
(1−p ji ))). (5)
For instances in positive bags, the gradient is:
∂L
∂p
j
i
=
∂L
∂pi
∂pi
∂p
j
i
=
∂L
∂pi
(
M∏
k=1,k,j
(1 − pki )). (6)
When there is one instance predicted as positive, other positive
instances will face the gradient vanishing issue. This will limit its
applications such as judging one frame is fake or not.
3.2 Sharp Multi-Instance Learning
Generally speaking, MIL algorithms can be divided into two folds:
instance-space paradigm and embedded-space paradigm [53]. Tra-
ditional MIL generally follows instance-space paradigm, which
aggregates instances on label output layer. Since the individual la-
bels are unknown, there is a bottleneck for the prediction accuracy,
caused by the insufficient training of instance-level model [53].
To integrate instances in embedded-space, we propose to use a
simple sum operator to fuse features of different instances. Let
Hi = [h1i , ...,hMi ] be a bag ofM embeddings extracted by the back-
bone network, and the classifier layer beW . Denote the fake scores
for the i-th video and the j-th frame in the i-th video as pi and p ji ,
respectively, then:
pi =
1
1 + e−W
∑M
j=1(h ji )
, p
j
i =
1
1 + e−Wh
j
i
. (7)
Actually, our proposed MIL can also be formulated in tradition
MIL manner as in Eq. 8, which is helpful in analyzing its theoretic
merits.
pi =
1
1 + e−W
∑M
j=1(h ji )
=
1
1 +
∏M
j=1( 1p ji − 1)
. (8)
The sharp characteristic With Eq. 8, it can be found that the
proposed MIL can ease the gradient vanishing problem, which is
proved in the supplementary. Besides, for an intuitive explanation,
we set M to 2 to show the gradient surface ∂L/∂p ji in 3D space
with respect to different p1i and p
2
i . As shown in the supplementary,
the gradient surface of the proposed MIL looks sharper than tra-
ditional MIL, resulting in a smaller area with vanished gradients.
This validates that the proposed formulation in S-MIL can relieve
the gradient vanishing problem.
Weighting mechanism Eq.8 simply treats instances equally with-
out any focus, which tends to be sub-optimal. For example, if
[p1i ,p2i ,p3i ] = [0.1, 0.1, 0.9], with Eq. 8, pi < 0.5, which is not con-
sistent of the definition of MIL.
Referring to the ideas of boosting [8] and focal loss [30], which
are designed to emphasizing the learning on hard examples, we
propose to “boost” the informative instances in bags. To the end,
the proposed S-MIL is defined as:
pi =
1
1 +
∏M
j=1( 1p ji − 1)
α ji
, a
j
i =
exp{w⊤hji }∑M
j=1 exp{w⊤hji }
, (9)
wherew is the learnable parameter of a neural network. It can adjust
the weights of different instances within one bag. The proposed
Figure 3: Visualization for manipulated faces across frame
sequences. Faces vary a lot along the temporal dimension.
S-MIL can also be converted to embedded-space and it is a weighted
sum of instances represented by low-dimensional embeddings hji :
pi =
1
1 +
∏M
j=1( 1p ji − 1)
α ji
=
1
1 + e−W
∑M
j=1(α ji h ji )
. (10)
There are some advantages of the weighting mechanism. First,
it is designed to enhance the weights of informative instances to
extract discriminative representations for input bags. Second, for
positive bags, the key instances are mostly positive ones, which
should be assigned with high weights. Thus, it can help to interpret
the final decision.
In similar research routine, attention-based multi-instance learn-
ing has been studied by previous work [23], which claims tradi-
tional MIL may face the gradient vanishing problem. Nevertheless,
the attention-based approaches explore the instance-bag relation
in a data-driven manner, and theoretic insight on how the gradi-
ent vanishing problem can be alleviated has not been provided.
In comparison, our method can be naturally explained with tradi-
tional MIL probabilistic framework, and also has the advantage of
attention-basedmodels where the gradients can be back-propagated
to instance embeddings without serious vanishing.
3.3 Spatial-temporal Instances
The S-MIL and traditional MIL are developed based on instances or
frames that are independent to each other and they are organized
at the spatial-level. It is true that faces are manipulated individually
and they are irrelevant to each other. However, from another point
of view, since they are made separately, the sequences along the
temporal dimension may not be as smooth as real face sequences.
As described in Fig. 3, the forgery faces vary drastically along the
temporal dimension. This important cue can be utilized for Deep-
Fake video detection. To model inter-frame consistencies between
faces extracted from nearby frames, based on the proposed S-MIL
framework, we design a new spatial-temporal instance by adding a
spatial-temporal branch with multiple temporal kernels. Inspired
by the previous sentence classification method [25], we utilize the
1-d CNN to encoding input frames in the temporal level.
Let Conv1dk,r , be a 1-d convolutional block, where r and k are
the number and size of filters respectively. Feeding feature map
Hi = [h1i ,h2i , ...,hMi ] generated by the CNN backbone, after zero
padding, into Conv1dk,r , we produce a M × r feature map. Then
ReLU activation function is performed on this feature map for non-
linearity. More formally, we describe the above process as
cki = ReLU (Conv1dk,r (Hi )), (11)
where cki is the spatial-temporal encoding bag for Hi with kernel
size k .
When we set the kernel size k as 2, it allows two adjacent rows
in hji to interact with each other. As the kernel size grows, more
nearby rows are exploited simultaneously. We employ kernel size k
of 2 and 3 for temporal encoding and at the same time, keep k = 1
to retain the spatial encoding instances as well. The number of
filters for each kernel size is set to 512.
Finally, several spatial-temporal encoded bags with different
kernel sizes compose a super bag to represent a video, which is
processed by S-MIL to get the final fake score for the input video.
Denote pi_k as the fake score of bag encoded with kernel size k ,
the final prediction of the input video is:
pi = S-MIL(pi_1,pi_2, ...,pi_k ), where pi_k = S-MIL(cki ).
(12)
3.4 Loss Function
Since we define the MIL DeepFake video detection as a binary
classification task, we choose the Binary Cross Entropy (BCE) as
our loss function. Given the positive probability pi of the i-th video,
the loss is calculated as follows and the entire network is trained
towards minimizing the following loss:
L = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi · log(pi ) + (1 − yi ) · log(1 − pi )). (13)
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the proposed algorithm
for DeepFake video detection and compare it with other counter-
parts in terms of partially attacked datasets evaluation, as well as
evaluations on fully attacked benchmarks under video-level and
frame-level settings. Also, we conduct an ablation study to explore
the influence of proposed components as well as the number of
sampled frames during the inference. For clarify, we denote S-MIL
as the version of method with k = 1, and S-MIL-T as the version
with k = 1, 2, 3 in subsequent experiments. We also provide a demo
video in supplementary.
4.1 DeepFake Video Detection Datasets
FaceForensics ++(FF++) [43]: It is a recent released benchmark
dataset and has beenwidely used for evaluation in differentworks [27,
43]. It consists of 1000 original videos and corresponding fake videos
which are generated by four typical manipulation methods: Deep-
Fakes (DF) [10], Face2Face (F2F) [50], FaceSwap (FS) [11], Neural-
Texures (NT) [49]. It provides frame-level labels and nearly every
frame and face in fake videos are manipulated.
Celeb-DF [29]: Celeb-DF dataset is composed of 5639 YouTube
videos based on 59 celebrities. These videos are tampered by the
DeepFake method and contain more than 2 million frames in total.
Figure 4: Visualization results with S-MIL for DeepFake video detection of two partially attacked example frame sequences [3,
15]. Faces in green and red boxes are real and fake respectively and the scores associatedwith these boxes are the corresponding
fake scores predicted by the proposed method.
The quality of the tampered videos looks great with little notable
visual artifacts. Nearly every frame in the video is manipulated.
Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC) [14]: DFDC is a preview
dataset released by DeepFake detection challenge1. This dataset is
generated by two kinds of unknown synthesis methods on 1131
original videos. Totally, it creates 4113 forgery videos based on
humans of various ethnic, ages and genders. It only provides video-
level labels and some fake videos contain many un-manipulated
frames and faces.
FaceForensics Plus with Mixing samples (FFPMS): Since ex-
isting datasets with frame labels have few video samples with
mixed real/fake instances, which is not beneficial for analyzing
performances in partial face attack scenario. We construct a new
benchmark called FaceForensics Plus with Mixing samples (FFPMS).
Specially, we sample 20 frames from each video in the FF++
testing set whose compress rate is c40 and replace several fake
frames with real frames from corresponding videos. The num-
ber of replaced fake frames ranges from 1 to 19. The resulting
dataset has 14000 frames, containing four kinds of fakes (DF, F2F,
FS, NT) and the original ones. With both frame-level labels and
video-level labels, this dataset is designed to model fake videos
with un-manipulated frames and faces, which is very common
in Youtube videos but rare in existing datasets except for DFDC.
However, DFDC does not contain frame-level labels.
4.2 Implementation Detail
We adopt XceptionNet as a default backbone network as other
works for fairness [27, 43]. For spatial and temporal encoding, we
set the kernel sizes to 1, 2, 3. The number of filters of each kernel size
is set to 512. All frame-based and video-based models are trained
with only 20 uniformly sampled frames in each video. For video-
based models, we utilize a batch size of 32 for training and finish
the training process after 30 epochs. During each training epoch, 8
frames are randomly extracted from the sampled 20 frames. Faces
1https://deepfakedetectionchallenge.ai/
are detected and cropped from the resulting frames as the video
input. We finetune on the ImageNet pretrained xception model with
a learning rate of 0.0002, which is reduced to half every 5 epochs.
During training, we adopt the Adam method [26] as the optimizer.
Only random crop and horizontal flip are employed during training
since we focus more on network designing. By default, 20 frames of
each video are uniformly extracted as network inputs for efficiency
during testing. More details about face detectors can be found in
supplementary.
4.3 Evaluation on Partially Attacked Datasets
We conduct the experiment on DFDC, Celeb, and FFPMS datasets
to evaluate the generalization ability of S-MIL. We compare the
proposed S-MIL with frame-based model such as XceptionNet [43],
D-FWA [28] and some video-based models such as LSTM [22] and
I3D [7]. Since the FF++ dataset, from which FFPMS is extracted,
contains few unmodified faces in fake training videos, we replace
25% of the whole fake frames with their corresponding real ones
in the fake videos for training the S-MIL model. The experiment is
evaluated by the average accuracy of fake and real testing videos.
For baseline XceptionNet, which is a frame-based method, there
are two ways for converting it to a video-level model, i.e., averaging
fake score of each frame or treating the maximum fake score as the
video-level prediction. For thorough analysis, we experiment on
both cases. Table 1 summarizes the accuracy of different detectors
with respect to each type of manipulated video in different datasets.
As shown in Table 1, the proposed S-MIL performs better than
both frame-based and video-based methods in most cases. Besides,
either in max or average ways, XceptionNet performs much worse
than the proposed S-MIL. When equipped with spatial-temporal
encoding as in S-MIL-T, the proposed method gets a better perfor-
mance. This validates the effectiveness of the proposed S-MIL and
spatial-temporal instances. We also compare the accuracies under
different noise levels on FFPMS dataset. As shown in Fig. 6, the
proposed S-MIL-T performs well even when there are only 10%
Original
Fake sequence
Grad CAM
Weights    0.1037               0.1311            0.1340                     0.0543                   0.1131                 0.0560                   0.1256                  0.0532                     0.1036                  0.1254
Figure 5: Visualization of a frame sequence and the corresponding heatmaps extracted with gradcam [46]. Faces in red bound-
ing boxes are fake. The last row shows the weights of each face. Forgery faces have higher weights than real faces.
fake faces in input instances, which outperforms frame-based Xcep-
tionNet and video-based LSTM significantly. Besides, as shown in
Fig. 5, the weights get higher on fake faces, which demonstrates
the interpretability of the proposed method.
Methods DFDC Celeb FFPMSDF F2F FS NT
XN-avg [43] 0.8458 0.9944 0.8036 0.7714 0.8036 0.7000
XN-max [43] 0.7687 0.8989 0.8536 0.7821 0.8571 0.6571
D-FWA [28] 0.8511 0.9858 0.7964 0.7571 0.8036 0.7214
LSTM [22] 0.7902 0.9573 0.8500 0.7564 0.7750 0.7393
I3D [7] 0.8082 0.9923 0.6214 0.6857 0.7071 0.6679
S-MIL 0.8378 0.9923 0.9036 0.8107 0.8609 0.7857
S-MIL-T 0.8511 0.9884 0.9071 0.8250 0.8857 0.7535
Table 1: Video-level accuracies of the proposed method and
other state-of-the-art methods on DFDC, Celeb and FFPMS
datasets. Results in bold text indicate the best results while
results in pink and blue indicate the best and the second-best
results appeared in proposed method.
4.4 Evaluation on Fully Attacked Datasets
Video-level benchmark results.We test the proposed S-MIL on
fully attacked datasets such as Celeb and FF++ to evaluate its gen-
eralization ability. For a comprehensive discussion, we compare
the proposed method with a frame-level detector such as Xception-
Net (XN), as well as video-level detectors, i.e., LSTM [22] and I3D [7].
As shown in Table 1 and 2, the proposed multi-instance method
outperforms frame-based detectors and video-based detectors in
most cases.
Frame-level benchmark results. Since recent works focus more
on frame-level detection, we also evaluate our method to validate
the generalization in frame-level detection case.
Methods CR FaceForensics++DF F2F FS NT
Video level accuracy
Fb XN-avg [43]
c0
1.0000 0.9964 0.9964 0.9964
Vb
LSTM [22] 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9929
I3D [7] 0.9857 0.9500 0.9714 0.9429
S-MIL 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.9786
S-MIL-T 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.9964
Fb XN-avg [43]
c23
1.0000 0.9964 0.9964 0.9393
Vb
LSTM [22] 0.9964 0.9929 0.9821 0.9393
I3D [7] 0.9286 0.9286 0.9643 0.9036
S-MIL 0.9857 0.9929 0.9929 0.9571
S-MIL-T 0.9964 0.9964 1.0000 0.9429
Fb XN-avg [43]
c40
0.9714 0.9250 0.9607 0.8607
Vb
LSTM [22] 0.9643 0.8821 0.9429 0.8821
I3D [7] 0.9107 0.8643 0.9143 0.7857
S-MIL 0.9679 0.9143 0.9464 0.8857
S-MIL-T 0.9714 0.9107 0.9607 0.8679
Frame level AUC
Fb XN-avg [43]
c0
0.9938 0.9953 0.9936 0.9729
Face X-ray [27] 0.9917 0.9906 0.9920 0.9893
Vb MIL [52] 0.9951 0.9859 0.9486 0.9796S-MIL 0.9984 0.9934 0.9961 0.9885
Table 2: Quantitative comparisons with the state-of-the-
art methods including frame-based(Fb) and video-based(Vb)
algorithms on the FF++ dataset under different compress
rates(CR) evaluated by video-level accuracy and frame-level
AUC. Results in bold text indicate the best results while re-
sults in pink and blue indicate the best and second-best re-
sults appeared in proposed method.
For this experiment, we take the FaceForensics++ (FF++)[43]
dataset as our training data. Only the spatial-level encoding branch
Methods CR FaceForensics++DF F2F FS NT
MIL [52]
c0
1.0000 0.9750 0.9679 0.9357
S-MIL 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.9786
S-MIL-T 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.9964
MIL [52]
c23
0.9857 0.9857 0.9786 0.8714
S-MIL 0.9857 0.9929 0.9929 0.9571
S-MIL-T 0.9964 0.9964 1.0000 0.9429
MIL [52]
c40
0.9500 0.8786 0.9071 0.8036
S-MIL 0.9679 0.9143 0.9464 0.8857
S-MIL-T 0.9714 0.9107 0.9607 0.8679
Table 3: Ablation study on FF++ dataset under different com-
press rates evaluated by video-level accuracy in terms of S-
MIL and spatial-temporal instances.
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Figure 6: Comparison for S-MIL-T, XceptionNet-avg, LSTM
on different rate of fake faces in input sequences of FFPMS
dataset. The S-MIL-T can get a good performance even when
the fake rate is low while others can not.
is employed for frame-level evaluation since there is no temporal
information during testing. Specifically, we sample 20 frames (less
than 10% of training data) from each video as training data and
extract 8 frames from samples randomly to form the video input
for S-MIL. During testing, each frame extracted from testing videos
is fed into S-MIL individually for frame-level evaluations. We eval-
uate the resulting four models on this dataset using Area Under
Curve (AUC) metric as frame-level methods [27, 43].
As shown in Table 2, the proposed S-MIL has achieved state-of-
the-art performance with only 10% training data. This shows that
our method can reliably judge input faces.
4.5 Ablation Study
Component analysis. As shown in Table 2 and 3, the proposed
S-MIL outperforms the traditional MIL significantly under both
frame-level and video-level settings. First, the proposed S-MIL can
relieve the gradient vanishing problem, which can help to force
every fake instance to be predicted as fake. Besides, the proposed
weighting mechanism can help to focus on more important in-
stances instead of treating instances uniformly. This can help to
gain a reliable prediction. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that with the
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Figure 7: Comparison results for DeepFake video detection
with different numbers of input instances on DFDC dataset.
With more samples, the proposed method can get a better
performance while others have little improvements.
spatial-temporal encoding module, the proposed method can get
a better performance, which validates the effectiveness of spatial-
temporal instances.
Inference on different number of frames. In video-based set-
tings, for efficiency, sampling is commonly used for less computa-
tional and time costs. Thus, the number of sampling frames is an
important factor in videos with noises. We explore the influences
of different number of frames on frame-based method XceptionNet,
video-based method LSTM, and the proposed S-MIL-T with DFDC
dataset. As shown in Fig. 7, the accuracy of proposed S-MIL-T raises
when more testing frames are sampled. However, with the growth
of sample numbers, the accuracies of XceptionNet and LSTM have
little changes, which in turn, shows the superiority of the proposed
S-MIL-T.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new problem of partially attacked
DeepFake video detection which is somewhat ignored in previ-
ous study but widely exists in real applications. We address this
problem with MIL paradigm by treating faces and each input video
as instances and bag respectively. Accordingly, we propose S-MIL
by building direct connection between bag label prediction and
instance embeddings, so that the gradient vanishing problem in
traditional MIL can be alleviated. We also conduct theoretic anal-
ysis to verify the sharp property of the loss function of S-MIL.
Second, a new spatial-temporal instance is designed to fully model
the inconsistency between faces in nearby frames, which helps to
improve the detection performance further. To inspire research on
video-level DeepFake detection under partial faces manipulation
situations, we construct a new dataset named FFPMS for evaluation
of partially attacked DeepFake video detection task. Experiments on
our FFPMS dataset and DFDC benchmark verify that our approach
is superior to other counterparts for DeepFake video detection.
Moreover, our approach can also be adapted to traditional single-
frame detection task and achieves state-of-the-art performance on
the FF++ datasets, showing a promising result for face information
protection.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 Proof
Section 3.2 has shown an alternative formulation for Multi Instance
Learning (MIL), which is given by:
p =
1
1 +
∏M
j=1( 1p j − 1)
, (14)
where p j is the output probability of j-th instance and M is the
total number of instances. Formula 14 merges the prediction of
all instances and outputs the final probability p. The final training
objective related to p is the cross entropy loss:
L(p) = −y log(p) − (1 − y) log(1 − p), (15)
where y is the ground-truth. For the convenience of derivation, we
present the traditional MIL method as follows:
pˆ = 1 −
M∏
j=1
(1 − p j ). (16)
In order to make a better distinction, we set pˆ as the output of tra-
ditional MIL. Note that traditional MIL also has the same objective
function as Eq. 15.
Next we explain why the newly proposed MIL paradigm could
relieve the gradient vanishing in positive example optimization in
traditional MIL and give a rigorous proof. Firstly, the derivative
with L to single instance p j can be calculated by:
∂L(p)
∂p j
=
∂L(p)
∂p
∂p
∂p j
= − 1
p
∂p
∂p j
=
p − 1
p j (1 − p j ) (17)
Similarly, for traditional MIL, we have:
∂L(pˆ)
∂p j
=
∂L(pˆ)
∂pˆ
∂pˆ
∂p j
= − 1
pˆ
∂pˆ
∂p j
=
pˆ − 1
pˆ(1 − p j ) (18)
Note that only positive samples are considered, so here ∂L(p)∂p = − 1p
and ∂L(pˆ)
∂pˆ = − 1pˆ . Based on Eq. 18, we can draw that limpˆ→1
pˆ−1
pˆ(1−p j ) =
0, which explains why gradient vanishing happened in traditional
MIL.
To prove that the proposed MIL can ease the gradient vanishing
problem of traditional MIL, we need to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given P as the space spanned by (p1,p2, ...,pm ), and two
subspaces Ω ⊂ P and Ωˆ ⊂ P defined as follows:
Ω =
{
(p1, ...pm )|(p1, ...pm ) ∈ P and ∂L(p)
∂p j
→ 0
}
(19)
Ωˆ =
{
(p1, ...pm )|(p1, ...pm ) ∈ P and ∂L(pˆ)
∂p j
→ 0
}
(20)
wherem is the number of instances. Ωˆ and Ω satisfies:
Ω ⊂ Ωˆ (21)
We can transfer the above lemma into the proof of the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. Ω is a proper subset of Ωˆ if and only if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(a) ∀(p1,p2, ...,pm ) ∈ Ω, (p1,p2, ...,pm ) ∈ Ωˆ (22)
(b) ∃(p1,p2, ...,pm ) ∈ Ωˆ, (p1,p2, ...,pm ) < Ω (23)
Proof of Lemma 2(a) For condition (a), if ∀(p1,p2, ...,pm ) ∈ Ω,
p−1
p j (1−p j ) → 0, we havep → 1, which is equivalent to 11+∏Mj=1( 1pj −1) →
1. It means for each
{
p j |j = 1, 2, ...,m}, there exists at least one
p j → 1. Put it into the Eq. 16, we can get pˆ → 1. Then L(pˆ)
∂p j = 0.
Thus, condition (a) sets up based on the above deduction.
Proof of Lemma 2(b) For condition (b), we need to find a special
case that satisfies pˆ−1pˆ(1−p j ) = 0 and
p−1
p j (1−p j ) , 0. To achieve this
goal, we pick two element pk ,pq ∈ {p j |j = 1, 2, ...,m} and set
pk = ϵ,pq = 1 − ϵ where ϵ → 0. Meanwhile, we set all the left p j
to δ where δ , 0 and δ , 1.
For traditional MIL, with Eq. 16, we have pˆ = 1−(1−ϵ)ϵδM−2 = 1.
Then L(pˆ)
∂p j =
pˆ−1
pˆ(1−p j ) = 0, which means the gradient will vanish in
this case.
As for newly proposedMIL, with Eq. 14, we havep = 11+(1/δ−1)M−2 .
Then ∂L(p)
∂p j =
1
1+(1/δ−1)M−2 /(δ (1 − δ )) , 0.
Finally, according to the proof above, gradient of the proposed
MIL formulation is still nonzero while gradient vanishing happens
in traditional MIL setting.
6.2 Visualization
We set M to 2 to show the gradient surface in 3D with respect to
different inputs(p1 and p2 are the X -axis and Y -axis respectively).
For traditional MIL, the gradient is:
∂L(pˆ)
∂p1
=
∂L(pˆ)
∂pˆ
∂pˆ
∂p1
=
pˆ − 1
pˆ(1 − p1)
=
1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2) − 1
[1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2)](1 − p1)
=
p2 − 1
1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2) (24)
(a) Surface                                                             (b) Contour of Original MIL                          (c) Contour of the proposed MIL
Figure 8: Visualization for MIL and the proposed MIL.
For sharp MIL, the gradient is:
∂L(p)
∂p1
=
∂L(p)
∂p
∂p
∂p1
=
p − 1
p1(1 − p1)
=
1
1+( 1
p1 −1)(
1
p2 −1)
− 1
p1(1 − p1)
=
p2 − 1
p1(2p1p2 + 1 − p1 − p2) (25)
As shown in Fig. 8, the area where gradient vanishes for proposed
sharp MIL is rather smaller than traditional MIL, validates that the
proposed S-MIL can relieve gradient vanishing problem.
6.3 Experiment Details
In our experiments, dlib is adopted as the face detector for FF++
dataset, which is consistent with codes published officially by au-
thors of Xception [44]. As for DFDC and Celeb datasets, we adopt
MTCNN [4] with GPU for efficiency. Faces in videos are directly
detected and extracted frame-by-frame with face detectors only,
without any face recognition or tracking methods. All the com-
pared methods are trained with their officially released codes and
evaluated based on the above face detection results for fairness
except for X-ray, who didn’t release their codes and the adopted
face detector, so we directly record the numbers from their original
papers for fair comparison.
